





A popular argument in favor of proﬁt sharing is that it increases employment, but the
theoretical basis for the claim is controversial and the empirical results are ambiguous.
This paper shows that employee stock ownership based on individually-held equity stakes
avoids the theoretical problems of traditional, group-based proﬁt sharing. Employee stock
ownership shifts employment to the eﬃcient level by either raising it from an initial state
of underemployment or decreasing it from an initial state of overemployment. Since the
eﬀect on employment is not unidirectional, empirical tests need to diﬀerentiate between
traditional proﬁt sharing and employee stock ownership and to condition on the initial
state of employment.
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Among the many arguments for and against proﬁt sharing, one of the most popular and
controversial is Weitzman’s (1984, 1987) conclusion that proﬁt sharing increases employment.
Weitzman used a union-ﬁrm bargaining model to show that giving workers a share of ﬁrm
proﬁts results in a lower wage which in turn increases the amount of labor demanded by
the ﬁrm. However, the empirical evidence that proﬁt sharing raises employment remains
inconclusive.1 And the theory depends on the assumption that workers bargain over just
the wage rather than employment and the wage. Hiring more workers dilutes the fraction
of the total proﬁt share each worker receives, so current employees will oppose additional
employment. Consequently, if bargaining over employment is allowed proﬁt sharing has no
impact on employment (Weitzman, 1987).
This paper shows that allowing employees to individually own equity stakes in their com-
pany, as occurs under standard forms of employee stock ownership that have become wide-
spread in recent years, can implement Weitzman’s ideas by avoiding this and other problems
with traditional, group-based proﬁt sharing. When workers own equity the wage rate falls
because dividends and capital gains displace wage income, but current employees no longer
have an incentive to oppose the hiring of more workers at the new wage. Since only workers
who own stock receive a share of the proﬁts, additional workers are tolerated as long as extra
employment contributes to proﬁts. As in a two-tier wage system, employment is more eﬃcient
because current and new workers receive diﬀerent incomes. Unlike in such a system, the ﬁrm
has no incentive to opportunistically replace current workers with new workers because they
receive the same wage and because current workers have a claim to equity that is unaﬀected
by termination.
While Weitzman concentrated on the problem of underemployment, unions are criticized
1In a survey of 11 studies Kruse (1998) ﬁnds that 6 have generally supportive results and 5 have mixed or
unfavorable results.
1not just for restricting employment opportunities by driving up wages but also for inﬂating
labor demand by featherbedding. These conﬂicting perspectives can be reconciled by insider-
outsider models which assume the union is concerned only with the utility of a limited number
of insiders (Carruth and Oswald, 1987). When the number of insiders is small relative to
demand, as may be true in a growing industry, underemployment results since insiders drive
up the wage without concern for lost employment opportunities to outsiders (Oswald, 1985).
When the number of insiders is large relative to demand, as may be true in a declining industry
or in a state enterprise being restructured, overemployment results as the union acts to ensure
jobs for insiders (McDonald and Solow, 1981).
In an insider-outsider model we ﬁnd that employee stock ownership can eliminate not only
underemployment but also overemployment, a problem that traditional proﬁt sharing cannot
solve. Oﬀering equity to insiders is an eﬀective way to “buy out” their opposition to downsizing.
Under regular proﬁt sharing workers forfeit their right to ﬁrm proﬁts once they leave the ﬁrm,
but equity-holding employees can retain their stake or can proﬁt by selling it upon exit. Since
stock ownership forces down the bargained wage rate and since exiting workers do not forfeit
their share of ﬁrm proﬁts, workers can be made indiﬀerent between continued employment for
the downsizing ﬁrm and the alternative of outside employment.
Regarding incentives to adopt employee stock ownership, Weitzman (1987) shows that
because current workers are hurt by proﬁt sharing the eﬃcient proﬁt share must be imposed
by the government. Not only does this give the ﬁrm and workers an incentive to evade the proﬁt
sharing system, but the exact share that induces neither too little nor too much employment
for a given ﬁrm is unlikely to be known by the government. These problems are avoided with
employee stock ownership. Both the ﬁrm and workers beneﬁt from the productivity gains of an
eﬃcient stake because workers can bargain to receive the equity at a discount. Moreover, there
is no need to set a knife-edge optimal stake because there is a minimum stake that induces
eﬃcient employment and higher stakes continue to lead to the same eﬃcient outcome.
2In addition to the assumption of no bargaining over employment, the proﬁt sharing results
require other key restrictions on the bargaining game. If the proﬁt share is open to bargaining
along with the wage, the bargaining outcome reverts to the same ineﬃcient solution as if there
were no proﬁt sharing (Anderson and Devereux, 1989). In contrast, bargaining over the equity
stake leads to an eﬃcient stake regardless of whether the stake is bargained over before wage
and employment bargaining or concurrently. The proﬁt sharing results also assume that both
insiders and outsiders are paid a uniform wage rather than allowing insiders to bargain for
a higher, separate wage. This assumption is not always defensible because insiders prefer a
two-tier wage system to proﬁt sharing and still prefer a two-tier system to uniform wages if
proﬁt sharing has been imposed. In the underemployment case employee stock ownership gives
insiders the same total income as a two-tier system while avoiding the danger that the ﬁrm will
opportunistically replace high-wage insiders with low-wage outsiders. In the overemployment
case two-tier wages oﬀer no beneﬁts to insiders so employee stock ownership is strictly preferred.
Regarding empirical predictions, studies have not always distinguished between traditional
group-based proﬁt sharing and the increasingly standard system of employees individually
owning equity stakes. This distinction is important not only because of the weak theoretical
basis for regular proﬁt sharing aﬀecting employment, but because equity stakes are not pre-
dicted to have a unidirectional impact on employment. When the number of insiders is small
and the initial employment level is ineﬃciently low, employee stock ownership is predicted to
increase employment. But when the number of insiders is large and the initial employment
level is ineﬃciently high, the opposite eﬀect is predicted. A properly speciﬁed test of em-
ployee stock ownership must therefore condition on the initial state of underemployment or
overemployment.
Distinguishing between traditional proﬁt sharing and employee stock ownership is also
necessary to understand the eﬀect of proﬁt sharing on employment variability. Based on
the idea that proﬁt sharing increases employment, it has been argued that ﬁrms with proﬁt
3sharing should have lower employment variability since they will reduce employment less when
demand falls (Weitzman, 1984; Weitzman, 1985). Regardless of the merits of this argument for
traditional proﬁt sharing,2 it does not follow in a model with stock ownership. As Carruth and
Oswald (1987) show, employment rigidity with ineﬃciently high or low employment is a feature
of collective bargaining. By giving workers an incentive to agree to the eﬃcient employment
level for diﬀerent demand conditions, employee stock ownership solves this rigidity problem
and therefore increases rather than decreases employment variability.
These results might oﬀer some insight into the popularity of employee stock ownership
despite the substantial costs to employees from inadequate diversiﬁcation (Meulbroek, 2002).
Employee stock ownership as analyzed in this paper covers several arrangements that are
common in the United States. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) allow workers to
accumulate equity which is held by a trustee until the worker retires or otherwise leaves the
company. 401(k) plans allow ﬁrms to use company stock to match employee contributions
to a trust which is available upon retirement or departure. Stock option plans allow employ-
ees to purchase stock at favorable prices in the future, thereby achieving the same linkage
between ﬁrm performance and employee income as systems in which employees hold stock.
And Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) allow ﬁrms to use payroll deductions to ﬁnance
employee acquisition of company stock at discounted rates. According to recent estimates
of the extent of employee stock ownership in the United States, about 8.8 million employees
participate in ESOPs, 8 to 10 million employees have stock options in their ﬁrms, about 11
million employees have 401(k) plans primarily invested in their own ﬁrm’s stock, and about
15.7 million employees participate in ESPPs.3
2The theoretical argument also depends on the assumption that the ﬁrm unilaterally determines employment.
In a survey of 11 studies (some of which also included tests of employment generation) Kruse (1998) ﬁnds that
5 support greater employment stability under proﬁt sharing and 6 show either no support or support only in
some samples. More recently Azfar and Danninger (2001) ﬁnd a positive relation between stability and proﬁt
sharing that promotes long-term skill accumulation.
3These numbers are from an April 2002 update of “A Statistical Proﬁle of Employee Ownership” compiled
by the National Center for Employee Ownership and available at http://www.nceo.org/library/eo stat.html.
Note that employees may participate in more than one plan.
42 The Problems with Proﬁt Sharing
This section reviews how either underemployment or overemployment can arise within an
insider-outsider model and highlights the diﬃculties of using proﬁt sharing as a solution to
underemployment. The following section then shows how employee stock ownership can resolve
both underemployment and overemployment.
Insider-outsider models assume a distinction between “insiders” who are represented in the
union utility function and “outsiders” whose welfare is of no concern to the union.4 In the
following we adopt the basic utility function of Caruth and Oswald (1987).5 Assuming there
are a total of ¯ Li inside workers with identical utility functions u(·), where u0 > 0a n du00 < 0,
and designating employment of inside workers by Li ∈ [0, ¯ Li] and outside workers by Lo ≥ 0,
the union utility function is deﬁned as U = u(y)Li + u(¯ w)(¯ Li − Li)w h e r ey is the income of
inside workers when employed by the ﬁrm and ¯ w is the market wage available outside the ﬁrm.
To represent proﬁt sharing, let the income of employed insiders be y = w + s
LΠ where w is
the bargained wage, s is the predetermined proﬁts h a r e ,Π is ﬁrm proﬁts, and L = Li + Lo.
Abstracting from other non-labor inputs, ﬁrm proﬁts are Π = R(L) − wL where ﬁrm revenue
R(L)s a t i s ﬁes RLL < 0, RL(0) > ¯ w, R(0) = 0, and RL(L∗)=¯ w for some L∗ > 0. We assume
the ﬁrm is risk neutral and wishes to maximize proﬁts net of the proﬁts h a r e . 6 In disagreement
inside workers receive the market wage ¯ w and the ﬁrm receives zero proﬁts.
Using the generalized Nash bargaining solution (Svejnar, 1986), union and ﬁrm bargaining
powers are γ ∈ (0,1) and 1 − γ respectively while union and ﬁrm bargaining positions or
4Throughout the paper we will assume workers are represented by a union. Without a union informal
bargaining may still arise or the ﬁrm may act proactively to keep wages and employment not too diﬀerent from
what a union could successfully bargain for. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) ﬁnd that workers in proﬁtable ﬁrms
enjoy a wage premium whether or not they are unionized.
5In the Lindbeck and Snower (1983) version of the insider-outsider model, insiders harass or fail to cooperate
with outsiders, lowering the productivity of outsiders and causing underemployment even without collective
bargaining. This paper’s results on underemployment also apply to the Lindbeck and Snower model, but not
the results on overemployment since it is not an issue in their model.
6If the ﬁrm is interested in maximizing proﬁts gross of the proﬁt share the solution is unaﬀected.











−σLi + µLo (1)
where σ and µ are the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for constraints Li ≤ ¯ Li and Lo ≥ 0.7
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(2)
which implies the income of employed workers in agreement, y = w + s
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. (3)
Since dw/ds < 0 Weitzman concluded that if the ﬁrm could unilaterally choose the employment
level, hiring labor up until RL = w, proﬁt sharing would increase employment. But Weitzman
also noted that this result does not hold in the general case where employment levels are
subject to bargaining. Allowing for such bargaining, the union will always want an insider to
be hired ﬁrst and the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, implying Lo =0i fLi ≤ ¯ Li, so from the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for maximizing with respect to Li and Lo we are left with three cases. Case I: All
insiders are employed (Li = ¯ Li) and some outsiders are employed (Lo > 0), implying RL = y.
Case II: All insiders are employed (Li = ¯ Li) and no outsiders are employed (Lo = 0), implying




1−γR/L. Case III: Some insiders are unemployed (Li < ¯ Li)a n d




1−γR/L.8 In all these cases the
employment level depends on y not on w because union members are naturally concerned with
their total income rather than just their wage income. Since y is unaﬀected by its distribution
7The conditions on R and u are insuﬃcient to ensure the bargaining set is convex, but we will save discussion
of this issue for the next section on employee stock ownership.
8If γ =1 /2 this reduces to the familar conclusion that along the contract curve the wage (or wage plus proﬁt





6Figure 1: Underemployment and overemployment
between wage income and proﬁt share income from equation (3) the proﬁt share is completely
irrelevant if employment is open to bargaining.9,10
Since the proﬁt share has no eﬀect, the standard analyses of union-ﬁrm bargaining without
proﬁt sharing still apply. In particular, Oswald (1985, 1993) considers Case I, Caruth and
9Anderson and Devereux (1989) extend Weitzman’s irrelevance result for the underemployment case to
the overemployment case. Note though that if proﬁt sharing increases per worker productivity then higher
productivity could indirectly induce higher employment (Wadhani and Wall, 1990; Kruse, 1992; Cahuc and
Dormont, 1997).
10Weitzman justiﬁed the assumption of no employment bargaining on the basis of Oswald’s (1985) argument
that the union will cede the employment decision to the ﬁrm when the number of insiders is small as in Case I.
If s =0t h e nRL = w in this case, meaning that insiders do not need to bargain over employment since the
outcome is the same employment level that the ﬁrm would choose unilaterally. But this argument does not
extend to s>0 since employment bargaining implies RL = w+
s
LΠ, meaning a lower employment level than if
the ﬁrm acted unilaterally.
7Oswald (1987) consider all three cases with a focus on Case II, and McDonald and Solow
(1981) analyze Case III. Figure 1 depicts employment and income levels in the three cases for
equal bargaining power (γ =1 /2) when the revenue function is quadratic, R = 100L − L2,
the outside wage ¯ w is normalized to zero, y = w because there is no proﬁt sharing, and each
insider has utility function u(y)=y1/2. The line segment AB represents the possible set of
bargaining outcomes with the exact outcome depending on the number of insiders. In Case I
the number of insiders is less than LA and insiders agree to the hiring of outsiders up until
there are LA total workers. Although the extra workers reduce average productivity and push
worker income down, the revenue gains are so large that the ﬁrm can successfully bargain
for the extra employment. Employment is still ineﬃciently low since the marginal revenue of
labor exceeds the outside wage of 0 at employment level LA. Case III represents the opposite
situation in which the number of insiders is so large and the losses of excessive employment so
high that the ﬁrm not only hires no outsiders but refuses to hire all insiders. For any number
of insiders greater than LB only LB of them are hired, but more than would be eﬃcient since
the marginal revenue of labor is negative at LB. Since risk averse workers are anxious to avoid
unemployment the union can successfully bargain for some excess employment of insiders.11
Case II represents the intermediate situation where the ﬁrm does not hire any outsiders but
does hire all the insiders. The employment level is therefore ﬁxed at ¯ Li, resulting in either
underemployment or overemployment depending on the number of insiders. Since the wage
is above the marginal product of labor, the ﬁrm would prefer to reduce employment but is
unable to do so in negotiations.
The following section shows how employee stock ownership can resolve employment ineﬃ-
ciencies in each case by reducing the wage rate to the market wage even when the employment
level is subject to bargaining.
11If worker utility functions are linear there are no gains to equalizing incomes across workers. In this case
equation (3) reduces to w = R/L −
1−γ




1−γR/L reduces to RL =¯ w, implying the
eﬃcient employment level.
83 Employee Stock Ownership
Employee stock ownership diﬀers from traditional proﬁt sharing in three essential ways. First,
insiders individually own equity rather than all workers as a group claiming a proﬁts h a r e .
Second, insiders can retain their equity stakes even if they leave the ﬁrm. Third, the adop-
tion of employee stock ownership is decided internally by the ﬁrm and workers rather than
imposed externally as is necessary under a proﬁt sharing system. We will show that employee
stock ownership can resolve underemployment because of the ﬁrst diﬀerence and can resolve
overemployment because of the second diﬀerence. Because of the third diﬀerence the eﬃcient
outcome can be reached in a way that beneﬁts both sides.
We assume all insiders have identical equity stakes summing to a fraction e of outstanding
equity. Since ﬁrm proﬁts are zero in disagreement the disagreement point remains unchanged
at (u(¯ w)¯ Li,0). Union utility in agreement is U = u(w+(e/¯ Li)Π)Li+u(¯ w+(e/¯ Li)Π)(¯ Li−Li).
Note that the s/L term in the proﬁt sharing model has been changed to e/¯ Li to incorporate
the ﬁrst diﬀerence between employee stock ownership and proﬁt sharing. The second diﬀerence
is reﬂected by unemployed insiders ¯ Li − Li also receiving an equity stake. The weighted Nash
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−σLi + µLo + ηw (4)
where σ, µ and η are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for constraints Li ≤ ¯ Li, Lo ≥ 0, and w ≥ ¯ w
respectively. We add this last restriction because outsiders will never work for less than ¯ w and,
without a proﬁt share dependent on continued employment, neither will insiders.
When the equity stake e is zero there are again the three cases identiﬁed in the previous
section. Underemployment occurs under Case I and also under Case II when RL(¯ Li) > ¯ w.
Overemployment occurs under Case III and also under Case II when RL(¯ Li) < ¯ w.T h ef o l l o w i n g
9proposition shows that a suﬃciently large equity stake can solve both problems. To ﬁnd this
equity stake we do not rely on diﬀerentiation of (4) because the bargaining set need not be
convex when the number of insiders is small as in Case I.12 We avoid this problem in the proof
of the following proposition by considering a convex superset of the bargaining set.
Proposition 1 There exists e∗ ∈ [0,1) such that for all e ∈ [e∗,1) the bargained employment
level is eﬃcient.
Proof: The bargaining set for a given e ∈ [0,1) is S(e)={(uu,u f) ∈ R2|uu = u(w +
(e/¯ Li)Π)Li + u(¯ w +( e/¯ Li)Π)(¯ Li − Li), uf =( 1− e)Π,f o r0≤ Li ≤ ¯ Li, Lo ≥ 0, and w ≥
¯ w} and the disagreement point is d =( u(¯ w)¯ Li,0 ) . E v e nw i t hf r e ed i s p o s a li nu t i l i t yt h e
bargaining set need not be convex,13 so we (i) construct another set S0 which is convex; (ii)
show that S(e) ⊂ S0 for all e ∈ [0,1); (iii) show that the solution to the game (S0,d)i n v o l v e s
eﬃcient employment and is in (S(e∗),d)f o rs o m ee∗ ∈ [0,1), implying by Nash’s axiom of the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that it is also the solution to the game (S(e∗),d); and
(iv) follow a similar sequence of steps to show that employment is still eﬃcient for e0 ∈ [e∗,1).
(i) Consider the set S0 = {(uu,u f) ∈ R2|uu ≤ u(¯ w +( β/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li, uf ≤ (1 − β)Π∗,f o r
0 ≤ β ≤ 1} where L∗ is the eﬃcient employment level, R∗ = R(L∗), and Π∗ = R∗− ¯ wL∗.S i n c e
u00 < 0 this set is convex.
(ii) Suppose instead that S(e) is not a subset of S0, implying since there is free disposal in
S0 that there is some (xu,x f)i nt h ee ﬃcient frontier of S(e)a n ds o m e( xu0
,x f0
)i nt h ee ﬃcient
frontier of S0 such that (a) xu >x u0





.B y t h e
concavity of the utility function, xu >x u0
implies (w+(e/¯ Li)Π)Li +(¯ w+(e/¯ Li)Π)(¯ Li −Li) >
(¯ w +( e/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li and the comparable relation holds for xu ≥ xu0
. Therefore both (a)a n d( b)
12Such a nonconvexity can be seen in Figure 2. The problem of nonconvexities was raised by Alexander
and Ledermann (1996) who show the bargaining set may not be convex if the number of insiders is large as in
McDonald and Solow (1981) but bargaining is over the wage alone.






















¯ Li + xf0
, (5)
or, simplifying, R− ¯ wLi −wLo >R ∗ − ¯ wL∗.S i n c ew ≥ ¯ w and R∗ − ¯ wL∗ maximizes proﬁts for
w =¯ w this cannot hold.











The solution β∗ is in (0,1) because the disagreement point is within the interior of S0 and
β ≤ 0 implies a union payoﬀ no greater than its disagreement payoﬀ and β ≥ 1i m p l i e saﬁrm
payoﬀ no greater than its disagreement payoﬀ.N o w s e t w =¯ wand let Li = ¯ Li and Lo =
L∗ − ¯ Li if ¯ Li ≤ L∗,a n dl e tLi = ¯ Li and Lo =0i f¯ Li ≥ L∗, giving the point in S(e = β∗)o f
¡
u(¯ w +( β∗/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li,( 1− β∗)Π∗¢
. This is the solution to the game (S0,d).
(iv) Now consider bargaining games for e0 >e ∗. Deﬁne S0(e0)={(uu,u f) ∈ R2|uu ≤ u(¯ w+
(β/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li, uf ≤ (1 − β)Π∗,f o re0 ≤ β ≤ 1}.N o t e t h a t
¡
u(¯ w +( e0/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li,( 1− e0)Π∗¢
Pareto dominates any point in S0(e0) with lower worker utility. Since e0 >e ∗ any point on the ef-
ﬁcient frontier with higher worker utility involves a higher tradeoﬀ with ﬁrm utility than occurs
at S0(e∗). And since the Nash product is homogenous of degree one, any point on a Nash level
set with higher worker utility involves a lower tradeoﬀ with ﬁrm utility than occurs at S0(e∗).
So the solution to (S0(e0),d)f o re0 ∈ [e∗,1) must be
¡
u(¯ w +( e0/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li,( 1− e0)Π∗¢
.F o l l o w -
ing the same logic as before, now set w =¯ wand let Li = ¯ Li and Lo = L∗−¯ Li if ¯ Li ≤ L∗,a n dl e t
Li = ¯ Li and Lo =0i f¯ Li ≥ L∗, giving the point in S(e0)o f
¡
u(¯ w +( e0/¯ Li)Π∗)¯ Li,( 1− e0)Π∗¢
,
which is the solution to the game (S0(e0),d). ¥
It might seem that employees must be majority owners in the ﬁrm to agree to eﬃcient
employment levels.14 But the ﬁrm already has some bargaining power so it is only necessary
14Of course, one solution is for insiders to buy all of the ﬁrm and either set wages at market levels or require
11to strengthen the ﬁrm’s position by giving workers some stake in a more eﬃcient outcome. In
fact, the equity stake necessary to gain suﬃcient concessions need not be very large. Solving






u(y∗) − u(¯ w)
u0(y∗)
. (7)
Continuing the example of Figure 1 in which the number of insiders is 25, the optimal
employment level is 50, and γ =1 /2, eﬃcient employment is guaranteed for e∗ =1 /3. The
bargaining sets S(e∗)a n dS0 and the Nash level set for the solution are shown for this example
in Figure 2. Due to the equity stake, higher ﬁrm payoﬀs also lead to higher union payoﬀs.
This alignment of interests is seen by the pointed shape of the bargaining set and particularly
by the rising slope of the set on the frontier to the left of the peak. The nonconvexity on the
eﬃcient frontier to the right arises because even in this linear example the marginal impact on
ﬁrm payoﬀso fh i g h e rw o r k e rp a y o ﬀs is not monotonically increasing. The problem of potential
multiple solutions due to this nonconvexity is avoided by choosing e = e∗ so that the solution
to (S0,d)i si nS(e∗).
While e∗ guarantees eﬃciency, a smaller stake might be adequate to attain eﬃcient em-
ployment when ¯ Li <L ∗.D i ﬀerentiating equation (4) with respect to w when ¯ Li <L ∗ gives








u(y∗) − u(¯ w)
u0(y∗)
, (8)
or, in our example, e =1 /6. Due to the nonconvexity this equity stake may not be suﬃcient
to maximize the Nash product, though in our example it is.15 While equity stakes below e∗
might attain suﬃcient employment, equity stakes above e∗ always lead to eﬃcient employment,
an important issue since proﬁt sharing above the optimum leads to excess employment. With
new workers to also buy stock in the ﬁrm.
15Using the same example but with worker bargaining power γ =7 /8, the equity stake e
∗ =7 /9 guarantees
eﬃciency while the lower stake e =7 /18 would seem to from (8) but does not due to a nonconvexity.
12Figure 2: Bargaining with eﬃcient stake e∗ =1 /3.
higher equity stakes the peak of S(e) shifts along to the right, staying on the frontier of S0
where employment is eﬃcient. The bargaining solution is at the eﬃcient peak since any other
point implies a lower Nash product.
With an eﬃcient equity stake the bargained wage equals the market wage,16 so insiders are
indiﬀerent to the employment level and the bargained outcome is the same employment choice
the ﬁrm would make unilaterally. Allowing the ﬁrm to choose employment is particularly
attractive because the optimal level is likely to change with demand conditions. As long
as e∗ is suﬃciently high to ensure the wage remains at the market wage for possible labor
demand curves, the ﬁrm will be able to rapidly adjust to changing demand. Rather than
reducing employment variability, equity stakes allow the ﬁrm to eﬃciently adjust employment
as conditions change.
An alternative to employee stock ownership which can also solve underemployment is a
16In an eﬃciency wage model this might not be a virtue since above-market wages increase productivity
(Levine, 1989). Note that some of the productivity beneﬁts of higher wages in an eﬃciency wage model might
accrue instead from workers owning equity.
13two-tier wage system in which outsiders are paid the market wage. Employee stock ownership
mimics this system by giving insiders a higher income even as all workers receive the same
wage. Since wages are equal, the employer does not have an incentive to opportunistically
replace higher wage insiders with lower wage new workers, thereby avoiding a principle danger
of two-tier wage structures. With an eﬃcient equity stake if insiders decide to switch from
bargaining over a uniform wage for all workers to bargaining over a higher wage for themselves
alone they will still receive the market wage in the bargaining solution.17 Unlike with proﬁt
sharing, the assumption of uniform wages is therefore not crucial to the results.
Regarding overemployment, one alternative is to equalize the incomes of employed and un-
employed insiders through better unemployment insurance, but this involves adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Another option is to use cash payments to encourage workers to
exit voluntarily, but workers will continue to press to enter the ﬁrm if the wage is above the
market wage. Employee stock ownership works as an equivalent method that is self-enforcing.
Since the wage rate is pushed down to the market wage, workers are willing to leave the ﬁrm
voluntarily. Although proﬁt sharing also pushes down the wage rate, workers will not leave
because they forfeit their proﬁt share upon exit.
A key issue is whether an eﬃcient equity stake will be voluntarily agreed to by both sides.
Even if the assumptions necessary to support proﬁt sharing’s positive eﬀect on underemploy-
ment are correct, proﬁt sharing must be imposed by the government since insiders will oppose
it (Weitzman, 1987). In contrast, employee stock ownership allows insiders to beneﬁtf r o mt h e
increased eﬃciency achieved by employing workers at the point where their marginal revenue
product in the ﬁrm equals their opportunity cost of working for the ﬁrm.18
Proposition 2 If insiders and the ﬁrm bargain over the equity stake with zero equity as the
disagreement point (i) insiders acquire an eﬃcient stake and (ii) the equity is traded at a
17Allowing for such bargaining does not change the set S
0 so the bargaining outcome is unaﬀected for e
∗ = β
∗.
18Ognedal (1992) ﬁnds both sides cannot beneﬁt from equity stakes because the employment level is assumed
to be ﬁxed or to be set strategically by the ﬁrm at an overly high level, allowing for no eﬃciency gains to be
shared.
14discount.
Proof: (i)L e tq be the price for e =1 ,s ot h a teq is the price for share e.L e t b e be a
stake that induces eﬃcient employment. Consider any pair (e0,q0)w h e r ee0 does not induce
eﬃcient employment. Let L0
i,L 0
o,R 0, Π0 and w0 be the bargaining outcomes for e = e0. We
are interested in an equity price b q such that (b e, b q) Pareto dominates (e0,q0), implying that
(e0,q0) cannot be the bargaining outcome. With (b e, b q) union utility is u(¯ w + b e
¯ LiΠ∗ − b e
¯ Lib q)L∗
i +
u(¯ w + b e
¯ LiΠ∗ − b e
¯ Lib q)(¯ Li − L∗
i)o r ,s i m p l i f y i n g ,u(¯ w + b e
¯ Li(Π∗ − b q))¯ Li. With (e0,q0) union utility
is u(w0 + e0
¯ LiΠ0 − e0
¯ Liq0)L0
i + u(¯ w + e0
¯ LiΠ0 − e0
¯ Liq0)(¯ Li − L0
i). By the concavity of insiders’ utility
functions, the union is strictly better oﬀ with (b e, b q)w h e n















(¯ Li − L0
i)( 9 )
or, simplifying, b q = Π∗ − ((w0 − ¯ w)L0
i + e0(Π0 − q0))/b e. Regarding the ﬁrm, its payoﬀ is (1 −
b e)Π∗+b eb q with (b e, b q)a n d( 1 −e0)Π0+e0q0 with (e0,q0), so the ﬁrm is no worse oﬀ for (1−b e)Π∗+b eb q ≥
(1 − e0)Π0 + e0q0. Substituting in b q and simplifying, the condition reduces to
R∗ − ¯ wL∗ ≥ R0 − w0L0
o − ¯ wL0
i. (10)
which, since w0 ≥ ¯ w, must hold by the deﬁnition of eﬃcient employment. The union is strictly
better oﬀ with (b e, b q)a n dt h eﬁrm is no worse oﬀ,s o( b e, b q)Pareto dominates (e0,q0).
(ii) The market will anticipate the sale of equity so the market price is the proﬁt level with
optimal employment, Π∗. Suppose that the bargained q is greater than or equal to Π∗.For
the union to agree to this purchase its agreement payoﬀ must exceed its disagreement payoﬀ.
Letting w0 and L0














q)(¯ Li − L∗
i) ≥ u(w0)L0
i + u(¯ w)(¯ Li − L0
i). (11)
15Substituting and simplifying this is possible for q ≥ Π∗ only if u(¯ w) ≥ u(w0). But w0 > ¯ w for
γ>0. ¥
This model assumes that workers hold on to their equity stake but stock ownership reduces
the bargained wage so workers have an incentive to resell their equity before bargaining over
the wage (Grout, 1988). Such an incentive may explain why ESOPs and other employee stock
ownership systems generally restrict the ability of employees to resell their equity. Note also
that equity stakes are sometimes agreed to as part of a package with wage concessions (Kruse,
1996) so bargaining might be simultaneous rather than sequential.19 If the equity stake, wage,
and employment are all bargained over concurrently and the disagreement point is (u(¯ w)¯ Li,0),
the solution to the game (S0,d) in Proposition 1 is still feasible, implying an eﬃcient outcome
is still reached.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that employee stock ownership can, in theory, solve the principal shortcom-
ings of traditional proﬁt sharing regarding ineﬃcient employment levels. First, it can resolve
both underemployment and overemployment. Second, there is a minimum equity stake that
leads to employment eﬃciency rather than a single eﬃcient stake for particular demand con-
ditions. Third, the results do not depend on special restrictions on the bargaining game such
as insiders and the ﬁrm not being able to bargain over employment levels, or insiders and out-
siders having to be paid the same wage. Fourth, it does not require government intervention
since both sides have an incentive to reach an agreement.
The success of employee stock ownership depends on one similarity with and three key
diﬀerences from traditional proﬁt sharing. The similarity is that in a bargaining model income
from the equity stake pushes down the wage rate. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that each insider
19In Kovenock and Sparks (1992) concessions arise for a related but distinct reason. The willingness of the
company to oﬀer shares to workers is proof of the company’s poor outlook, so workers agree to eﬃciency-
enhancing wage concessions.
16receives a portion of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts rather than workers as a whole receiving a share which
is then divided. Insiders are therefore more willing to allow new workers to be hired when
employment is ineﬃciently low. The second diﬀerence is that workers can retain a right to their
equity stake even if they leave the company. This makes workers less opposed to exiting the ﬁrm
when employment is ineﬃciently high. The third diﬀerence is the adoption of employee stock
ownership is determined internally by the ﬁrm and workers rather than imposed externally as
is necessary under a proﬁt sharing system. The eﬃcient outcome can therefore be reached in
aw a yt h a tb e n e ﬁts both sides.
Because of these diﬀerence, the two systems oﬀer substantially diﬀerent empirical predic-
tions. Rather than unambiguously raising employment, employee stock ownership is expected
to shift employment either up or down depending on the initial state of underemployment or
overemployment. And rather than reducing employment variability, employee stock owner-
ship should allow ﬁrms to change employment more rapidly in the face of changing demand
conditions.
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